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NEUTRALIZING GRUTTER 
Girardeau A. Spann· 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger upheld 
the use of racial affirmative action as a means of increasing student 
diversity at the University of Michigan Law School.1 But in doing so, 
the Court also prohibited the use of racial quotas in affirmative ac-
tion programs, finding the pursuit of racial balance to be a "patently 
unconstitutional" governmental objective.2 Gruttds prohibition on 
racial balance is nominally rooted in a desire to promote colorblind 
race neutrality in the culture's allocation of resources.3 But ironically, 
it is the Supreme Court's aversion to racial balance itself that perpetu-
ates contemporary racial discrimination. 
For people who believe that the conscious pursuit of racial bal-
ance offers the only realistic hope of achieving a meaningful level of 
racial equality in the United States, Grutter is disappointing. It is 
reminiscent of earlier Supreme Court decisions, such as Dred Scott, 4 
where the Court curiously chose to invalidate efforts by the political 
branches to promote racial justice. There are a variety of ways in 
which the political branches can resist the racial balance restriction 
that Grutter imposes. They range from mild efforts to camouflage the 
pursuit of racial balance, to more radical efforts that challenge the le-
gitimacy of judicial review itself. However, the degree to which con-
temporary culture is willing to resist the Supreme Court's prohibition 
©Girardeau A. Spann, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, 
D.C. I would like to thank Lisa Heinzerling and Steven Goldberg for their help in developing 
the ideas expressed in this Article. Research for this Article was supported by a grant from the 
Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 See Gruner v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003) (upholding an educational affirmative 
action program that gave holistic and individualized consideration to applicants); cf Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003) (invalidating an educational affirmative action program 
that awarded a specified number of points to minority applicants as too mechanical to be nar-
rowly tailored). 
2 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
' See id. at 326--27 (asserting preference for race neutrality, and applying strict scrutiny to all 
racial classifications, including benign affirmative action classifications). 
4 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857) (invalidating a congres-
sional statute prohibiting slavery in the Louisiana Territory). 
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on achieving racial balance will be a direct function of the degree to 
which the culture is committed to the principle of racial equality. 
Part I of this Article argues that the Supreme Court lacks the insti-
tutional competence to formulate racial policy for the nation, and 
highlights the tension that exists between the Court's abstract prefer-
ence for race neutrality and the concrete reality of contemporary 
race relations, in which dedicated efforts to promote racial balance 
offer the only meaningful hope of eliminating systemic dis-
crimination. Part II discusses moderate strategies that can be used to 
deflect the impact of Gruttds prohibition on racial balance, suggest-
ing that racial balancing can be restructured in ways that the Su-
preme Court may view as constitutional. Part III discusses more radi-
cal strategies that can be used to promote racial balance, and 
advocates a direct confrontation with the institution of judicial review 
in the context of affirmative action. The Article concludes that the 
political branches of government possess the power to overcome Su-
preme Court impediments to racial justice, and hopes that they also 
possess the will to exercise that power. 
I. RACIAL POLICY 
The Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decision in Grutter 
v. Bollinger insists that efforts to achieve racial balance are unconstitu-
tional.6 However, it is far from clear that the Supreme Court should 
be viewed as having the institutional competence to make such a de-
termination. Moreover, even if one concedes to the Court the power 
to formulate affirmative action policy, the Court's racial balance pro-
hibition still seems wrong on the merits. The current Court is preoc-
cupied with the concept of race neutrality, but the nature of contem-
porary racial discrimination is such that only explicit efforts to 
achieve racial balance seem likely to promote racial equality. 
A. Institutional Competence 
Grutter is premised on the belief that the political branches of gov-
ernment must ask the Supreme Court for permission to solve the 
longstanding problem of racial discrimination in the United States. 
That is a curious premise for at least three reasons. First, the institu-
tion of judicial review cannot plausibly be understood to give the Su-
preme Court the countermajoritarian power to formulate racial pol-
icy in a democratic society. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment 
5 539 U.S. at 306. 
6 See id. at 330 (stating that the use of racial quotas "would amount to outright racial balanc-
ing, which is patently unconstitutional."). 
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gives Congress-not the Supreme Court-the power to remedy dis-
crimination against racial minorities, thereby making it anomalous 
for the Supreme Court to invalidate mcyoritarian affirmative action 
programs on the grounds that the Court knows better than the politi-
cal branches what will satisfY the equal protection demands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the Supreme Court has such a dis-
mal record in the protection of racial minority rights that it is difficult 
to see why anyone with a genuine interest in promoting racial justice 
would believe that the Court could do a better job than the political 
branches in protecting minority rights. 
The existence of judicial review in a democratic society has always 
been problematic. It poses the countermajoritarian danger that un-
elected judges, who are intentionally insulated from political ac-
countability, will have the ability to formulate social policy in ways 
that trump the policy preferences of the representative branches of 
government. 7 Although the constitutional legitimacy of judicial re-
view is now widely accepted, it is difficult to imagine that the Framers 
envisioned anything like the role that the Supreme Court has come 
to play in the debate over controversial social issues such as abortion, 
school prayer, and affirmative action.8 A species of judicial review 
that limited Supreme Court involvement in the political process to 
the enforcement of determinate norms that were clearly expressed in 
the Constitution could perhaps be reconciled with the process of 
democratic self governance.9 However, it is difficult to deem democ-
ratic the Supreme Court's substitution of judicial policy preferences 
for political policy preferences in the interpretation of constitutional 
norms that are inherently political in nature. 
7 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-45 (4th ed. 2001) (dis-
cussing the countermajoritarian difficulty posed by judicial review). The Constitution attempts 
to insulate the Supreme Court from political influence through the devices of life tenure and 
salary protection. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (declaring that "[t]he Judges, both of the su-
preme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office."). See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAJNST THE COURT: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 14-15 (1993) [hereinafter RACE 
AGAJNST THE COURT] (discussing formal safeguards for Supreme Court independence). 
8 In asserting the power of judicial review, ChiefJusticeJohn Marshall recognized the diffi-
culty inherent in allowing the Supreme Court to resolve innately political questions. See Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that "[t]he province of the court is, 
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive offi-
cers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or 
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court."). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936) (describing the mechanical proc-
ess of judicial review); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 35-39 (discussing mechanical inter-
pretations of the Constitution as a response to the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
636 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:3 
The Constitution, of course, says nothing about affirmative action, 
and the Supreme Court's only constitutional basis for regulating the 
content of affirmative action programs stems from the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 10 But it is hard to find in the phrase "equal protection" 
any justification for Supreme Court invalidation of affirmative action 
burdens that the political majority has chosen to impose upon itself 
to "equalize" the status of those racial minorities whom American cul-
ture has historically treated as inferior. One could, of course, vig-
orously dispute what it takes to promote racial "equality" in contem-
porary culture. However, it is difficult to see why the Supreme Court 
should be viewed as institutionally more competent than the political 
branches of government to resolve that dispute. 11 
Things get worse when one remembers that the equal protection 
guarantee used by the Supreme Court as the basis for regulating af-
firmative action is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 The 
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to authorize the Supreme 
Court to formulate racial policy. Rather, it was adopted in order to 
authorize Congress to enhance the status of racial minorities, and to 
protect such congressional "affirmative action" from Supreme Court 
invalidation. Mter the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, which was designed to end discrimination against former 
black slaves in places of public accommodation. However, federalism 
doubts about the constitutionality of the Act prompted adoption of 
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."). The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment also contains a tacit equal protection component that applies to 
the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (finding a tacit 
equal protection safeguard in the Fifth Amendment). 
11 For a more extended argument against judicial review in the context of racial discrimina-
tion, see RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7. Other scholars have presented general argu-
ments questioning the scope and desirability of judicial review. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REAsONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 4-5 (1996) (favoring "incompletely theorized agree-
ments" over comprehensive or definitive judicial resolutions of controversial political issues); 
CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CAsE AT A TIME: jUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) 
(favoring narrow Supreme Court decisions that permit democratic reflection by the elected 
branches); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (dis-
favoring judicial review); see also Robert P. George, Law, Democracy, and Moral Disagreement, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1399-1400 (1997) (reviewing AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1996) and CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REAsONING AND 
POLITICAL CONFLICT ( 1996), and favoring political over judicial resolutions of morally charged 
political conflicts); Michael]. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 414 (1997) (arguing, 
as a positive matter, that judicial review often entails mere deference to majoritarian political 
preferences). But see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1362 (1997) (favoring judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation to be binding on other branches of government). 
12 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (stating that affirmative action 
programs have to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contained the substantive equal protection guarantee,13 and 
Section 5 authorized Congress to enforce the provisions of Section 114 
precisely so that the Supreme Court would not invalidate such reme-
dial efforts on constitutional grounds. The Fourteenth Amendment, 
therefore, was designed to authorize political remedies for racial dis-
crimination, and to give federal remedies primacy over state "Black 
Codes" that had officially legislated the inferiority of blacks. 15 Noth-
ing in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment can plausibly be 
read to authorize the Supreme Court to invalidate state or federal po-
litical enactments that are designed to enhance the status of racial mi-
norities. Rather, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes 
that questions about the policy prudence and the constitutional valid-
ity of affirmative action are questions that, in Marbury terms, are "in 
their nature political."16 
When the majority, acting through the political branches of gov-
ernment, chooses to impose a burden on itself in order to advance its 
understanding of racial equality, there is no basis for invoking the 
heightened judicial scrutiny that the Court typically reserves for cases 
involving suspect governmental motives. In representation-reinforce-
ment terms, there is no reason to fear that the majoritarian political 
process is seeking to disadvantage a discrete-and-insular minority 
group that is unable to protect its own interests in the pluralist politi-
cal process. 17 The Supreme Court asserts thatjudicial intervention in 
the affirmative action debate is needed to protect the individual 
equal protection rights of whites who are burdened by affirmative ac-
tion.18 But that merely begs the question. Whites burdened by af-
firmative action are not unconstitutionally discriminated against any 
more than methadone users who are denied municipal employment 
because of their participation in drug treatment programs. But the 
1
' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 (guaranteeing equal protection to all individuals). 
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article."). The other Reconstruction Amendments had 
similar provisions authorizing Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, to enforce their sub-
stantive guarantees. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the 
prohibition against involuntary servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XV,§ 2 (authorizing Congress 
to enforce the right to vote without abridgment on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude). 
15 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 431-33 (discussing the history of the Reconstruction 
Amendments). 
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
17 For the prevailing account of how government policymakers can discount the interests of 
discrete-and-insular minorities, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
jUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
18 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause 
protects persons rather than groups) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peila, 515 U.S. 
200,227 (1995)). 
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Supreme Court defers to the value judgments made by the political 
branches in the methadone case, while strictly scrutinizing the value 
judgments made by the political branches in affirmative action 
cases.
19 This is true even though methadone users, who are likely to 
be both poor and members of racial minority groups,20 would seem to 
present a much stronger claim to discrete-and-insular minority status 
than members of the white m,Yority who are burdened by an affirma-
tive action program. If there is any justification for this differential 
treatment, it must be based on the belief that there is something spe-
cial about racial affirmative action classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause that warrants heightened judicial scrutiny. But as 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes, the value judg-
ments entailed in adopting an affirmative action program are more 
amenable to legislative balancing in the representative political proc-
ess than to politically unaccountable judicial balancing in the guise of 
interpreting the words "equal protection." For better or worse, ju-
dicial review is now understood to authorize the Court to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause. However, because of the complex and in-
tractable policy judgments at issue, the substantive content of the 
Equal Protection Clause can defensibly be derived only from the rep-
resentative political process. The Fourteenth Amendment does not 
itself provide any non-political definition of "equality," or any judi-
cially manageable standards for deriving such a definition. 
My claim that the Supreme Court lacks the institutional compe-
tence to formulate racial policy under the Equal Protection Clause is 
borne out by the history of Supreme Court adjudications in race 
cases. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated "affirmative ac-
tion" programs that the majoritarian branches of government have 
adopted to advance the interests of racial minorities, even though 
there is no apparent reason for the Court to have done so. Dred Scott 
provides the most obvious example. In an effort to provide a legisla-
tive solution to the increasingly contentious issue of slavery in new 
United States Territories, Congress passed the Missouri Compromise 
Act of 1854. The Supreme Court, however, invalidated that political 
compromise in Dred Scott, and in the process, held that blacks were 
19 Compare New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979) (applying 
minimal equal protection scrutiny to a rule prohibiting the employment of even qualified 
methadone users), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223--27 (applying strict equal protection scrutiny to 
a minority set-aside program adopted by Congress for federally-funded construction projects). 
20 Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White,]., dissenting) ("Heroin addiction is a special problem 
of the poor, and the addict population is composed largely of racial minorities ... ."). 
21 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating a congressional statute 
prohibiting the holding of slaves in the territory of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36 deg. 30 
min. north latitude). 
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not "citizens" within the meaning of the United States Constitution.22 
By so constitutionalizing the inferior status of blacks, the Court pre-
cluded the possibility of future political solutions to the problem of 
slavery. Because it left opponents of slavery with no other political 
recourse, Dred Scott is now widely viewed as a disastrous decision that 
both precipitated the Civil War, and created the need for the Recon-
struction Amendments to the Constitution. 23 
If there is a lesson in Dred Scott about the perils inherent in the po-
litically unaccountable judicial formulation of racial policy, the Su-
preme Court has not yet learned it. The Court has continued to in-
validate affirmative action programs adopted by the political 
branches whenever those programs do not comport with the Court's 
own conception of sound racial policy. The Court invalidated an af-
firmative action program for minority medical students in its 1978 
Bakke decision24 and a municipal set-aside plan for minority contrac-
tors in its 1989 Croson decision.25 And it applied what, prior to Grutter, 
had always been fatal strict scrutiny to a similar federal set-aside plan 
in its 1995 Adarand decision. 26 Moreover, in its 1993 Shaw v. Reno de-
cision,27 the Court applied strict scrutiny to a North Carolina maJority-
minority redistricting plan that had been created to comply with the 
federal Voting Rights Act by increasing minority political representa-
tion in Congress. The Court then went on to use Shaw v. Reno as a 
basis for invalidating a number of majority-minority redistricting 
plans. It invalidated a Georgia plan in its 1995 Miller v. johnson deci-
sion.28 It invalidated the Shaw v. Reno North Carolina plan after re-
mand in its 1996 Shaw v. Hunt decision,29 and invalidated a Texas 
plan in its 1996 Bush v. Vera decision.30 The Court also invalidated a 
Justice Department directive to create an additional Georgia majority-
minority district in its 1997 Abrams v. johnson decision.31 
Although Brown v. Board of Education32 is typically said to establish 
the Supreme Court's capacity to remedy racial oppression, even 
Brown does more to illustrate the problems entailed in Supreme 
22 See id. at 404-27 (holding that blacks were not included in the constitutional term "citi-
zens"). 
23 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 429-33 (discussing Dred Scott and its aftermath). 
24 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
25 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
26 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27 (1995). 
27 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 ( 1993). 
28 Millerv.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
29 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). 
"'Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
"Abramsv.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997). 
82 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (Brown I) (invalidating separate-but-
equal public school segregation); see aLw Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown 
II) (requiring desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed"). 
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Court racial policymaking than it does to answer them. Brown is said 
to have desegregated the public schools, and to have ended the gov-
ernment's use of racial classifications. But Brown did neither. The 
limited school desegregation that did occur was largely the result of 
actions taken by the political branches.33 And, as the racial profiling 
that has followed the September 11 terrorist attacks so clearly illus-
trates, Brown hardly ended the government's use of racial classifica-
tions.34 
This is not to say that the Supreme Court always rules against ra-
cial minority interests. The Court ufsheld voluntary affirmative action 
plans in its 1980 Fullilove decision, 5 and its 1990 Metro Broadcasting 
decision36-although Metro Broadcasting was overruled by the Court 
five years later in Adarand.31 The Court also rejected yet another chal-
lenge to a North Carolina majority-minority redistricting plan in its 
2001 Easley v. Cromartie decision,38 finding that the plan was motivated 
by political rather than racial considerations. 39 The problem is not 
that the Supreme Court always invalidates affirmative action pro-
grams. Rather, the problem is that the Court thinks it can tell the dif-
ference between an affirmative action program that is constitutional 
and one that is unconstitutional. 
33 See RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7, at 104-10 (discussing failure of Brown to de-
segregate schools or end governmental use of racial classifications). 
,. For examples of commentators noting the similarity between post-September 11 racial 
profiling and the treatment of Japanese American citizens during World War II, see Plight of the 
Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1915, 1930-39 (2002) and 
Liam Braber, Note, Korematsu 's Ghost: A Post-September lith Analysis of Race and National Security, 
47 VILL. L. REv. 451 (2002). See a£50 Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 
AsiAN LJ. 195, 197-200 (2002) (discussing how to apply lessons from the Japanese internment 
to racial profiling post-September 11); Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. 
INT'L LJ. 23, 33-39 (2002) (arguing that the September 11 attacks have begun to warp the bal-
ance between national security and civil liberties, as did World War II); Lori Sachs, Comment, 
September 11, 2001: The Constitution During Crisis: A New Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1715, 
1728-43 (2002) (discussing the role of the Supreme Court in World War II); Huong Vu, Note, 
Us Against Them: The Path to National Security is Paved f?y Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REv. 661, 665-76, 
691-93 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. Government and mainstream society have been willing to 
scapegoat racial minorities after national tragedies); Michael]. Whidden, Note, Unequaljustice: 
Arabs in America and United States Antitemnism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2825-30, 
2836-41 (2002) (arguing that modem terrorism legislation repeats the American habit of tar-
geting and stigmatizing immigrant groups and racial minorities). 
" Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
86 Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
" Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 225-27 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad-
castings use of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny). 
38 Easleyv. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
39 See id. at 257-58 (reversing the lower court's finding of racial motivation). For a fuller 
discussion of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions, see GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE 
LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TwEN"IY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND 
REMEDIES (2000) [hereinafter THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION). 
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Any affirmative action program that the white majority voluntarily 
adopts through the political process should be upheld under the 
Constitution because there is no reason to distrust the political proc-
ess with respect to benign affirmative action. But that is precisely the 
argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Adarand, holding that 
even benign affirmative action was subject to strict equal protection 
scrutiny.40 The value judgments that are entailed in deciding whether 
affirmative action constitutes sound social policy are far too subtle 
and delicate to be entrusted to an institution whose credentials for 
racial grudence and sensitivity include Dred Scott,41 Plessy,42 and Kore-
matsu. That is a recipe for permitting the racial policy of the nation 
to be determined not merely by the values of nine unaccountable 
people in black robes, but often by the policy preferences of one Jus-
tice who happens at any particular point in time to have the swing 
vote on the issue of affirmative action.44 Allowing the Supreme Court 
to have the final say in the formulation of the nation's affirmative ac-
tion policy raises the danger that racial minority rights will continue 
to be sacrificed in the name of racial equality, as they have been so 
sacrificed during most of the nation's history.45 Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court's racial balance decision in Grutter illustrates this 
problem. 
B. Racial Balance 
Grutter tends to be viewed as a case that is beneficial to racial mi-
norities because it upholds the use of racial affirmative action in an 
educational context, and holds that diversity can constitute a compel-
40 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (citing 
Adarand to support the position that benign affirmative action is subject to strict scrutiny). 
41 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 397 (1857) (holding that blacks could not be 
citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution). 
42 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial segregation). 
43 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military exclu-
sion order directed at persons of Japanese ancestry). 
44 Many contemporary Supreme Court affirmative action cases have been 5-4 decisions, with 
Justice O'Connor acting as the swing vote. See THE lAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39, 
at 159-61 (discussing affirmative action voting blocs on the Supreme Court). Indeed, the rea-
son that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the affirmative action program at issue in Grutter 
was that justice O'Connor, for the first time, switched sides and voted in favor of upholding a 
racial affirmative action program on the merits. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; see also THE lAW OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39, at 160 n.57 (enumerating the affirmative action voting re-
cord of justice O'Connor). 
45 For an extended argument that the social function of the Supreme Court has historically 
been to subordinate the interests of racial minorities to the interests of the white majority see 
RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7. 
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ling state interest for purposes of strict scrutiny.46 However, Gruttcr is 
likely to do more harm than good for minority interests, because it 
emphatically insists that the pursuit of racial balance as gart of an af-
firmative action program is "patently unconstitutional." By outlaw-
ing the pursuit of racial balance in the name of colorblind race neu-
trality, Gruttcr prohibits the only remedy that is likely to be effective in 
combating contemporary racial discrimination. 
Gruttcr evidences a clear Supreme Court preference for race-neu-
tral over race-conscious efforts to ameliorate the plight of racial mi-
norities. Race-neutral affirmative action is subject to only rational ba-
sis review, but race-conscious affirmative action is subject to strict 
equal protection scrutiny.48 Although the economic, political, and so-
cial disadvantages suffered by contemporary racial minorities are 
traceable to a long history of race-conscious discrimination, the Su-
preme Court believes that its asymmetrical preference for race-
neutral responses to race-conscious discrimination is justified by the 
need to prevent future race-based discrimination.49 As a result, the 
Court has largely limited the use of race-conscious remedies to those 
instances in which race-neutral remedies have been shown to be in-
adequate.50 
The Court's preference for race-neutrality has caused it to be hos-
tile to racial quotas and other efforts to achieve racial balance.51 The 
Court views the pursuit of racial balance as an effort to remedy what 
it terms general "societal discrimination."52 According to the Court, 
the problem with attempting to remedy societal discrimination is that 
it will necessarily result in vast remedial programs that impose im-
permissible burdens on innocent contemporary whites, who were not 
themselves the perpetrators of the long history of discrimination 
against racial minorities. 53 Therefore, the Court has consistently lim-
ited the use of race-conscious affirmative action to situations in which 
46 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33 ("Today we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest 
in attaining a diverse student body.") 
47 Id. at 308. 
48 See id. at 326--27 (applying strict scrutiny to even benign affirmative action); Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a benign affirma-
tive action program). 
49 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-30 (applying strict scrutiny to even benign racial classifica-
tions in order to protect the individual right to be free from racial discrimination). 
50 See id. at 237-38 (suggesting that strict scrutiny requires lack of race-neutral alternatives); 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (rejecting affirmative action pro-
gram because, inter alia, there was no evidence that the city council had considered race neu-
tral alternatives). But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (stating that narrow tailoring does not neces-
sarily require lack of race-neutral alternatives). 
51 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (finding the pursuit of racial balance to be "patently unconsti-
tutional"). 
52 See id. at 323 (prohibiting remedies for general "societal discrimination"). 
53 I d. at 323 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978)). 
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narrowly-tailored remedies are used to address particularized acts of 
discrimination. 54 
There are two problems with the Supreme Court's aversion to the 
pursuit of racial balance as a remedy for general societal discrimina-
tion. First, the argument is internally inconsistent in its effort to dis-
tinguish between individual and group injuries. Second, the argu-
ment is based on a faulty understanding of the nature of 
contemporary racial discrimination. Once those two problems are 
recognized, only a desire to discount the interests of racial minorities 
can justify continued Supreme Court hostility to the goal of achieving 
racial balance. 
The Supreme Court's view is that racial balance remedies for gen-
eral societal discrimination are unconstitutional because they impose 
.excessive burdens on whites.55 In its unadorned version, that argu-
ment is discriminatory on its face. For most of the nation's history, 
racial imbalance was perfectly constitutional when it was used to 
benefit whites, but racial balance is now unconstitutional when it is 
used to benefit racial minorities in an effort to equalize matters. The 
Supreme Court has attempted to sidestep this facial discrimination by 
embellishing its racial balance prohibition. It argues that the Equal 
Protection Clause protects individuals and not groups.56 Therefore, 
54 Justice Powell articulated this position in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10, and reasserted it in 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-79 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Led 
by Justice O'Connor, this view has now been adopted by a majority of the Court. See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 323 (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination); id. at 330 
(rejecting racial balancing as "patently unconstitutional"); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. 
Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990) (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (stating that 
"an interest in remedying societal discrimination cannot be considered compelling"); Croson, 
488 U.S. at 496-98 (O'Connor,]., plurality opinion) (stating "'societal discrimination' ... is an 
inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications"); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 
647-53 (1987) (O'Connor,]., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting societal discrimination); 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor,]., concurring) ("'[S]ocietal' discrimination, that is, dis-
crimination not traceable to [an agency's] own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compel-
ling to pass constitutional muster .... "). In Grutter, a majority of the Supreme Court for the 
first time held that promoting prospective racial diversity in an educational context could con-
stitute a compelling governmental interest, but the Court reaffirmed its prohibition on the use 
of racial balance to remedy general societal discrimination. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323. 
55 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310) (noting that remedying societal 
discrimination risks "placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties 'who bear no re-
sponsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought 
to have suffered.'"). 
56 See id. at 323 (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause safeguards individual rights 
rather than group rights). There has been a longstanding debate concerning whether the 
Equal Protection Clause is properly understood as protecting individual rights or group rights. 
Compare Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principk, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 48-52 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently dis-
crimination remedies, should be viewed as individual phenomena) and Michael J. Perry, The 
Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HAsTINGS LJ. 1133, 1145-48 (1981) ("[T]he group-centered con-
ception creates [tension] with our individual-centered constitutional jurisprudence"), with 
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the Equal Protection Clause permits only remedies for particularized 
acts of discrimination, and not for the systemic societal discrimina-
tion to which racial balance remedies are directed. 57 The premise of 
this argument is, of course, wrong. As has been noted, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted specifi-
cally to authorize legislative remedies for discrimination against the 
group of newly freed black slaves, and legislative remedies are by their 
d . 58 nature group reme 1es. 
In addition to its faulty premise, the Supreme Court's racial bal-
ance prohibition is also internally inconsistent. It first assumes that 
the burdens imposed on whites as a result of affirmative action are 
individual injuries, and that they can therefore be redressed without 
violating the Equal Protection Clause. It then assumes that the bur-
dens imposed on racial minorities as a result of societal discrimina-
tion are group injuries, and that they cannot therefore be redressed 
without violating the Equal Protection Clause. However, the two in-
juries are precisely the same. Both result from a determination made 
by a governmental institution to sacrifice the interests of one racial 
group in order to advance the interests of another racial group. And 
whatever it is about the injury to whites that makes racial balance 
remedies unconstitutional would certainly seem to apply to the injury 
to racial minorities that results from the refusal to allow racial bal-
ance remedies. The only difference between the two is the race of 
the group that is being harmed. And despite the Supreme Court's 
contrary suggestion, it simply cannot be true that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause permits the continued sacrifice of racial minority interests 
in order to advance the interests of whites. 
Aside from being logically problematic, the Supreme Court's pro-
hibition on the use of racial balance to remedy general societal dis-
crimination is based on a misunderstanding of the manner in which 
contemporary racial discrimination operates. The Court reads the 
Equal Protection Clause as something that is addressed to particular-
ized injuries resulting from identifiable acts of invidious racial dis-
crimination. Although such particularized discrimination of course 
continues to exist, the truly troubling aspect of contemporary racial 
discrimination is statistical in nature. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting 
opinion in Gratz v. Bollingef9 -in which the Supreme Court invali-
dated the University of Michigan's undergraduate affirmative action 
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107, 147-77 (1976) 
(arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as 
group phenomena). 
57 See cases cited supra note 54. 
58 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
59 539 u.s. 244 (2003). 
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program despite upholding Michigan Law School's affirmative action 
program the same day in Grutter60 -offers a striking statistical demon-
stration of the ways in which racial minorities continue to be under-
represented in the allocation of significant societal resources.61 Be-
cause the criteria that we use to distribute societal resources have 
been shaped by centuries of racial prejudice, it is not surprising that 
those criteria continue systematically to disadvantage racial minorities 
in ways that benefit the white majority. From standardized tests, to 
union memberships, to housing patterns, to voting districts, our re-
source allocation criteria continue to reflect the racial attitudes that 
have been firmly internalized by the culture at large. Moreover, the 
racial skews embedded in those criteria now often operate in ways 
that are largely unconscious.62 As a result, mere conscious efforts to 
guard against our unconscious prejudices are likely to be ineffective 
safeguards in most cases. All of this suggests that only dedicated ef-
forts to achieve racial balance are likely to neutralize the culture's 
natural propensity to allocate resources in a racially discriminatory 
way. To the extent that the Supreme Court holds such racial balance 
efforts to be unconstitutional, the Court is reading the Constitution 
to require continued discrimination in the allocation of resources. 
The Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing, and its con-
comitant indifference to general societal discrimination, seem to re-
flect a belief that prospective race neutrality is largelr adequate to sat-
isfY the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.6 However, that 
belief reduces the concept of racial equality to a theoretical abstrac-
tion having very little to do with the concrete discrimination that con-
tinues to disadvantage racial minorities in everyday life. If you are 
not a member of a racial minority group, and you doubt the severity 
of the societal disadvantages that racial minorities are forced to en-
dure in contemporary culture, ask yourself whether you would be 
willing to give up your white majority status and become a member of 
a racial minority group. Similarly, if you are inclined to oppose af-
firmative action because you believe that racial minorities are unfairly 
advantaged by racial preferences, ask yourself whether you would be 
60 539 U.S. at 306. 
61 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-300 nn.1-3 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting). 
62 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Jd, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318-44 (1987) (arguing that much contemporary racial discrimi-
nation is unconscious). · 
6
' This view is reflected in the Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari to review the 
Ninth Circuit's decision upholding California's Proposition 209, which explicitly prohibited 
race and gender affirmative action for the purpose of promoting prospective race and gender 
neutrality. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997) cert. de-
nied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997) ("As a matter of 'conventional' equal protection analysis, there is sim-
ply no doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional."); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 
209, 47 DUKE LJ. 187 (1997) (discussing Proposition 209litigation further). 
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willing to give up your white majority status in order to take advan-
tage of a racial affirmative action program. I predict that you would 
not be willing to relinquish your white majority status-precisely be-
cause you understand, with every fiber of your being, that the culture 
continues to discriminate against racial minorities in a myriad of sub-
de yet pervasive ways. 
The policy issues surrounding the use of affirmative action to help 
eliminate the racial underclass that has always been present in the 
United States are obviously quite complicated. The notion that the 
Supreme Court could eliminate the normative complexities entailed 
in the affirmative action debate simply by insisting on a prospective 
commitment to colorblind race neutrality is at best sophomoric. 
Once one recognizes the problems inherent in both the Supreme 
Court's prohibition on racial balance and its aversion to remedies for 
general societal discrimination, it is difficult to find a normatively de-
fensible justification for the Court's position. It seems obvious that 
the Court lacks the relative institutional competence to substitute its 
policy preferences for the preferences of the political branches of 
government when the political branches decide to adopt affirmative 
action programs that promote racial balance. It is almost as if the 
Supreme Court were intent on reprising the racial callousness of 
cases like Dred Scott,64 Plessy,65 and Korematsu,66 so that it could continue 
to discount the interests of racial minorities for the benefit of the 
white majority.67 
II. CREATIVE COMPLIANCE 
The meaning of an imprecise constitutional term such as "equal 
protection" is obviously contestable. That raises the question of how 
one should properly respond when one disagrees with the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of a constitutional provision. The position of 
the Supreme Court on this issue is clear. In Cooper v. Aaron,68 the 
Court announced that it has the final say over the meaning of the 
Constitution. 59 But, since the Court's assertion is itself an interpreta-
64 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (I9 How.) 397 (I857) (holding that blacks could not 
be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution). 
65 See Plessy v. Ferguson, I63 U.S. 537 (I896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial segrega-
tion). 
66 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 2I4 (1944) (upholding World War II military ex-
clusion order directed at japanese-American citizens). 
67 This conclusion is the primary thesis of RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7. 
68 358 U.S. I (I958). 
69 Id. at I8 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I37, I77 (I803)). The Cooper 
Court stated that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a per-
manent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Cooper, 358 U.S. at I8. 
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tion of the Constitution, Cooper simply generates a self-referential 
paradox that is utterly unhelpful. If one believes that the meaning of 
a constitutional provision is delegated by the Constitution to the po-
litical branches of government, then Cooper is not only wrong, but po-
litical deference to Cooper would itself be unconstitutional, as it would 
violate the doctrine of separation of powers by vesting policymaking 
power in the wrong branch of government. Arguably, the uncertainty 
that exists concerning which branch of government possesses ulti-
mate expository power under the Constitution is a good thing. It may 
prompt continuous inter-branch negotiations over contentious issues 
of social policy in a way that facilitates proper operation of our system 
of checks and balances.70 If one shares that view, one is likely to favor 
"creative compliance" with the Court's prohibition on racial balanc-
ing. Creative compliance will enable the political branches to secure 
some of the benefits of racial balance, through the use of proxies and 
camouflage techniques, without directly confronting the Supreme 
Court's assertion of power over the political branches through the in-
stitution of judicial review. The use of proxies and camouflage by the 
representative branches will also provide feedback to the Court con-
cerning the political viability of its constitutional pronouncements, 
thereby enabling the Court to factor that feedback into its future con-
stitutional expositions. 
A. Proxies 
The most obvious way in which the political branches of govern-
ment could comply with the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial 
balancing, while still seeking to secure at least some of the benefits of 
racial balance, is to implement affirmative action plans that use race-
neutral factors as proxies for race. This strategy seems ironically ap-
propriate because much of the contemporary racial discrimination 
that affirmative action is designed to counteract also operates 
through the use of proxies. In the past, American culture used ex-
plicit racial discrimination to exclude racial minorities from U.S. soil, 
from desirable education, from desirable employment, from desir-
able housing, and from exercising political J?ower. Minorities were 
barred from immigrating to the United States 1 and from holding cer-
70 This, in part, is the thesis of a book by Louis Michael Seidman about judicial review. See 
LoUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND jUDICIAL REVIEW (2001) (arguing against any final judicial resolution 
of open constitutional questions). 
71 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 509-10 (2d ed. 1985) (dis-
cussing the Chinese Exclusion. laws which prohibited the immigration and re-immigration of 
Chinese persons and included the 1902 statute which permanently banned Chinese entry). 
648 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:3 
tainjobs.72 Minorities were prohibited from being educated,73 or were 
educated in segregated schools.74 They were prohibited from living 
in certain neighborhoods75 and from voting. 76 As the statistics cited in 
Justice Ginsburg's Gratz dissent illustrate, American culture still dis-
criminates against racial minorities in many areas." However, in the 
post civil rights era where the option of de jure racial discrimination 
has been restricted,78 de facto racial discrimination tends to be im-
plemented through the use of proxies that correlate with race. Con-
temporary minorities are kept out of predominantly white schools 
72 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free": Ji'ree Blacks in 
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 43 (1991) (discussing Virginia 
laws that effectively prevented blacks from practicing professions such as teaching and law by 
forbidding free blacks to congregate); Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get Therefrom Here?: Hrrw the 
Law Still Threatens King's Dream, 22 LAw & INEQ. 1, 13-15 (2004) (discussing statutory and regu-
latory restrictions that prohibited blacks from practicing law, and from becoming plumbers and 
barbers). · 
73 See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SlAVES MADE 561-
66 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972) (discussing legal prohibitions on educating slaves as demon-
strated by laws outlawing the sale of writing materials to slaves and the Catholic Church's his-
torical denial of the scriptures to the "ignorant and impressionable"). 
74 See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating the "separate-but-equal" doc-
trine used to justify segregation in public schools); see also Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) 
(requiring desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed"). 
75 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 2~23 (1948) (reversing state court enforcement 
of racially restrictive covenant in the sale of residential real property); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 
U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (reversing state court enforcement of laws requiring residential racial segre-
gation). 
76 For example, the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted in 
1870 to eliminate the widespread disenfranchisement of blacks that existed prior to the Civil 
War. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (holding that the right to vote cannot be abridged on account 
of race). Even after adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, however, blacks were effectively 
disenfranchised in many states by devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and voting districts 
which diluted minority voting strength. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended to address 
this de facto disenfranchisement. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: 
The Transformation of Voting Rights jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838-53 (1992) (discuss-
ing the purposes and history of the Voting Rights Act, and attempts over the years to thwart 
these purposes). 
77 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing 
statistical disadvantages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in areas including edu-
cation, employment, and housing); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 938 (1995) (Gins-
burg,]., dissenting) (noting that Georgia did not send a post-Reconstruction black to Congress 
until1972, seven years after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (emphasizing that prior to a redistricting plan 
adopted in response to the 1990 Census, North Carolina had not sent a black representative to 
Congress since the Reconstruction). . 
78 In overruling the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), 
Brown I is typically understood to have prohibited most governmental uses of racial classifica-
tions. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-96 (invalidating the "separate-but-equal" doctrine in public 
schools). However, the race-based actions that have been taken in the government's post-
September 11 war on terrorism illustrate that some racial classifications are still permitted. See 
supra note 34 (citing articles that discuss similaritjes between present race-based security meas-
ures and race-based Japanese internment during World War II). 
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through the use of district lines and standardized test scores.79 Mi-
norities are kept out of predominantly white jobs through the use of 
standardized test scores and subjective employment standards.80 Mi-
norities are kept out of predominantly white neighborhoods through 
the use of zoning restrictions.81 Finally, minorities are kept out of 
predominantly white legislatures through the use of gerrymandered 
voting districts.82 Accordingly, the use of racial proxies to remedy ra-
cial imbalance that itself results from the use of racial proxies seems 
congruent enough to constitute a form of poetic justice. 
Due to a history of pervasive discrimination against racial minori-
ties, racial minorities are an economically disadvantaged class.83 That 
means that economic disadvantage can now often be used as a proxy 
for race in affirmative action programs. Although affirmative action 
initiatives based on economic disadvantage will be facially neutral, 
they will still have a disproportionately beneficial impact on racial 
minorities because racial minorities are overrepresented among 
those who suffer economic disadvantage. The Supreme Court is 
likely to view economic affirmative action as constitutionally per-
missible precisely because it appears to be facially neutral.84 
79 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 366--71 (2003) (Thomas,]., dissenting) (arguing 
that law schools could increase diversity by abandoning racially-£orrelated selection criteria 
such as the LSAT); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow 
interdistrict judicial remedies for school segregation, thereby permitting suburban schools to 
remain predominantly white and inner-£ity schools to remain overwhelmingly minority). 
80 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing statistical disadvan-
tages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in terms of employment); Wards Cove 
'Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (explaining why percentile disparities in em-
ployment do not necessarily make out a prima facie case of discrimination and adopting strin-
gent standards under Title VII for proof of discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
238-48 (1976) (holding that any racially disparate impact resulting from the use of standard-
ized tests in the employment context does not violate the Equal Protection Clause in the ab-
sence of intentional discrimination). 
81 See, e.g., Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71 
(1977) (rejecting claim that residential zoning restriction was racially discriminatory without 
any proof that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
498-508 (1975) (holding that the petitioners did not have standing to challenge zoning ordi-
nance as racially discriminatory without additional evidence of personal impact caused by the 
ordinance). 
82 See, e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 938 (1995) (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) (noting that 
Georgia did not send a post-Reconstruction black to Congress until 1972, seven years after the 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that prior to a redistricting plan adopted in response to the 
1990 Census, North Carolina had not sent a black representative to Congress since the Recon-
struction). 
83 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing statistical disadvan-
tages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in terms of wealth and income). 
84 Indeed, the Court at times seems to invite the use of economic affirmative action. See, e.g., 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-13, 223--24 (1995) (upholding affirma-
tive action for contractors who are socially and economically disadvantaged, but applying strict 
scrutiny to statutory presumption that racial minorities are so disadvantaged). 
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In a strict doctrinal sense, the use of economic disadvantage as a 
proxy for racial disadvantage should not work. The Supreme Court's 
decision in Washington v. Davis85 seems clearly to focus on discrimi-
nato~ intent as the factor that establishes an equal protection viola-
tion.8 As a result, the intent to promote racial balance through the 
use of a racial proxy would initially seem to be identical to-and just 
as unconstitutional as-the intent to pursue racial balance explicitly. 
However, if the Supreme Court were to delve that deeply into the in-
tent of executive or legislative policymakers, even when those policy-
makers used classifications that were race-neutral on their face, the 
Court would be analytically required to delve just as deeply into the 
intent lying beneath all of the facially neutral classifications that 
American culture presently uses to disadvantage racial minorities with 
respect to education, employment, housing, and political power.87 
And that, of course, is something that the Court seems unwilling to 
do because of its disruptive effect on the current allocation of re-
88 
sources. 
It is also possible to design affirmative action programs that pro-
mote racial balance by using proxies that have a higher correlation 
with race than does mere economic disadvantage. For example, 
things like demonstrated ability to overcome hardship and demon-
strated commitment to social justice might be useful proxies for race, 
if one believes that racial minorities are particularly likely to possess 
those qualities. The racial correlation of such proxies can be further 
increased by focusing on factors such as the use of English as a sec-
ond language, or membership in a family having an incarcerated 
parent.89 Once again, those sorts of proxies are likely to be useful in 
85 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
86 See id. at 238-48 (holding that programs based on disadvantage, not race, are subject to 
relaxed judicial scrutiny, as opposed to racial classifications which mandate strict judicial scru-
tiny directed at govemmental intent). 
87 It is, of course, possible that the Court would find the presence of unconstitutional intent 
in a facially neutral affirmative action program, but not in a facially neutral classification that 
was intended to promote societal discrimination--even though the two were analytically analo-
gous. Such a tacit distinction may have been what actually motivated the Court's decision in 
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), where the Court distinguished between 
unconstitutional actuating intent and constitutionally permissible incidental intent. See id. at 
278-80 (distinguishing between discriminatory purpose and mere awareness of racially dispa-
rate impact). Although Feeney involved allegations of gender discrimination, its elaboration of 
the intent requirement is equally applicable to cases of racial discrimination. See id. at 272-73 
(discussing racial discrimination as prototype). 
88 See, e.g., id. at 278--80 (upholding arguably discriminatory intent that was found to be 
merely incidental). 
89 See, e.g., Kim Ford-Mazuri, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 
88 GEO. LJ. 2331, 2332-37 (2000) (stating that some schools promote diversity by considering 
essays in which applicants discuss past difficulties and hardships that tend to affect racial mi-
norities). 
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advancing racial balance objectives because they correlate highly with 
race. The correlation can be increased even more by focusing on fac-
tors such as an individual's experience with overt racial discrimina-
tion; an individual's ability to offer perspectives that are typically miss-
ing from predominantly white institutions; and the likelihood that an 
individual will provide resources to minority communities.90 As the 
racial proxy becomes more transparent, however, the Supreme Court 
may be more likely to view its use as an unconstitutional effort to pro-
mote racial balance.91 
One racial proxy that has ironically gained popularity even among 
moderate conservatives is the class rank proxy. Rather than relying 
on overt racial affirmative action in educational contexts, class rank 
plans automatically admit to state colleges any high school student 
who graduates in the top X percent of his or her class. The specified 
percentages tend to range from the top 4% to the top 20% of gradu-
ating classes.92 To the extent that class rank and X-percent proxies 
are appealing, it is because they are facially neutral. However, such 
programs can promote racial balance onll in states where high 
schools are racially segregated to begin with.9 
One of the most noticeable recent uses of racial proxies has been 
in the context of voter redistricting. After the 1990 Census created 
new congressional seats in states whose past voting discrimination 
made them subject to the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights 
Act, the Supreme Court began a campaign to oversee the racial poli-
tics of congressional redistricting. In Shaw v. Reno,94 the Court held 
that the intentional creation of voting districts in which a majority of 
the voters were racial minorities was unconstitutional.95 Racial major-
ity-minority voting districts are a useful way of promoting racial bal-
90 See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. 
]. RACE & LAw I, 7-10 (2001) (arguing that admissions preferences should be granted on the 
basis of such factors). 
91 Cf Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (refusing to dismiss a constitu-
tional challenge to a new facially-neutral voting district for the City of Tuskegee, Alabama, 
where the shape of the district had been changed from a square to "a strangely irregular twenty-
eight-sided figure" that excluded virtually all black voters); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
373--74 (1886) (invalidating a conviction for violating a facially-neutral ordinance that required 
laundries to be housed in stone or brick buildings, where virtually all who were denied exemp-
tions were Chinese). 
92 See Roithmayr, supra note 90, at 10--14 (discussing class rank programs and their mixed 
success in aiding racial minorities). 
93 See id. at 13 (discussing dependence of class rank plans on segregated nature of high 
schools). 
94 509 u.s. 630 (1993). 
95 See id. at 641-49 (applying strict scrutiny to voting district whose shape was so bizarre that 
it could only be explained by racial motivation); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17 
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to voting districts where race was a "predominant factor" in 
drawing district lines). 
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ance because they increase the amount of representation that racial 
minorities are able to secure in Congress. When minority voters are 
concentrated in minority dominated voting districts, they have a 
greater chance of electing a representative who is responsive to their 
interests than when minority voters are dispersed throughout white 
dominated voting districts. 
After having had to resolve a series of cases during the 1990s in 
which the Court had to decide whether race had been given too 
much weight in drawing district lines, the Court ultimatelr signaled a 
retreat from this unwieldy issue. In Easley v. Cromartie,9 the Court 
upheld a gerrymandered voting district with a high concentration of 
minority voters on the ground that race had not been used for its 
own sake, but rather had been used as a proxy for political party af-
filiation.97 Accordingly, the Supreme Court now seems to have en-
dorsed the constitutionality of at least this proxy for racial balance, 
and it has done so despite the relative transparency of the proxy. 
Proxies can mitigate the harshness of the Supreme Court's prohi-
bition on racial balancing. However, they still permit the Supreme 
Court to have the final say over the constitutionality of racial policies 
that the representative branches seek to implement through use of a 
proxy. That suggests that the more effective a racial proxy is in pro-
moting meaningful racial balance, the more likely the Supreme 
Court is to invalidate it as a veiled attempt to sidestep the Court's own 
racial policy preferences. Perhaps more surreptitious measures are 
therefore appropriate. 
B. Camouflage 
A second way in which the political branches could try to dilute 
the force of the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing is 
by attempting to camouflage whatever racial balance policies they 
choose to adopt. Gruttercontains the Court's most recent articulation 
of its longstanding view that the pursuit of racial balance is constitu-
tionally impermissible.98 However, Grutter itself can be read to sup-
port the proposition that well-camouflaged racial balancing is consti-
tutionally permissible. When Grutteris compared to Gratz,99 it appears 
that the Court chose to uphold the affirmative action program that 
was more closely connected to racial balance, and to invalidate the 
96 532 u.s. 234 (2001). 
97 See id. at 257-58 (permitting political party affiliation to be used as a proxy for race in the 
redistricting context). 
98 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (rejecting racial balancing as "patently un-
constitutional"). 
99 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating the racial affirmative action pro-
gram at the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science and Arts). 
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program that was less likely to advance that goal. This suggests that 
the Supreme Court may ultimately be more interested in form than 
in substance with respect to the issue of racial balance. 
Grutter upheld the constitutionality of the University of Michigan 
Law School's affirmative action program. 100 The Court held that the 
Law School had a compelling interest in diversity, which was suffi-
cient to survive the strict equal protection scrutiny that applied to the 
school's use of a racial preference for minority students in the admis-
sions process. 101 The Court also held that the use of a racial "plus" 
factor, rather than a numerical quota, was a narrowly tailored way to 
advance the school's interest in diversity, and that it satisfied the 
equal protection demand that each applicant be given particularized 
consideration. 102 The Court stressed that such a holistic consideration 
helped ensure that each applicant would be treated as an individual 
rather than merely as a member of a racial group. 103 
On the same day that Grutter was decided, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Gratz invalidated the University of Michigan's under-
graduate affirmative action program.104 Although the goal of increas-
ing student diversity remained compelling, 105 the undergraduate af-
firmative action program was too mechanical to satisfy the narrow 
tailoring requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. 106 Because the 
undergraduate program automatically awarded a large fixed number 
of points to each minority applicant, it had "the effect of making 'the 
factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified un-
derrepresented minority applicant."107 The failure to use a more par-
ticularized selection process, therefore, made the undergraduate 
program unconstitutional. 108 
Despite the holistic and particularized consideration that the Su-
preme Court found to be constitutionally essential in Grutter, the Law 
School affirmative action program that the Grutter Court upheld ap-
pears to have been implemented in a way that was designed to pro-
mote racial balance. As Chief Justice Rehnquist convincingly demon-
strated in his Grutter dissent, the percentages of various racial minor-
ity groups admitted under the Law School program closely reflected 
100 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 32~0 (upholding a law school affirmative action program that 
gave holistic and individualized consideration to applicants). 
101 !d. at 328-29. 
102 !d. at 333-41. 
103 !d. at 337. 
104 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76. 
105 I d. at 268. 
106 ld. at 270-74. 
107 Id. at 272 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 ( 1978)) (ellip-
sis in original). 
108 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72. 
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the percentages of those same minority groups in the overall Law 
School applicant pool. 109 A majority of the admitted minority stu-
dents were black; half of that number were Latino; and one-sixth of 
that initial number were indigenous Indians. The Law School de-
fended its program on the ground that it sought to ensure the admis-
sion of a "critical mass" of students from each relevant minority 
group, thereby enabling a meaningful exchange of ideas and per-
spectives among students. However, the low number of Indian stu-
dents admitted under the program was much too small to constitute a 
critical mass. That further supported the conclusion that racial bal-
ance was the actual motive of the Law School program. 110 
Although the undergraduate program was invalidated in Gratz on 
the grounds that it mechanically awarded a fixed number of points to 
each underrepresented minority applicant, 111 there is nothing inher-
ent in the award of a fixed number of points that would necessarily re-
flect racial balance. Indeed, if the school were primarily interested in 
racial balance, it might well prefer a program that awarded a variable 
number of points to racial minority group applicants. A variable 
point program would enable the school to regulate the number of 
points awarded for membership in various minority groups in a way 
that enabled the school to achieve more directly whatever racial bal-
ance it desired. 
What emerges from a comparison of Grutter and Gratz is the pos-
sibility that an appropriate degree of camouflage will permit the pur-
suit of racial balance. The arguments made by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in his Grutter dissent were cogent enough that the Grutter 
majority could not have simply overlooked them. Rather, the major-
ity must have concluded that the Law School program deserved to be 
upheld despite that danger that it was motivated by a desire to pro-
mote racial balance. Perhaps, the Court preferred the Grutter pro-
gram to the Gratz program because the fixed numerical bonus in 
Gratz simply looked more like a racial quota than the nominally more 
particularized racial "plus" in the Grutter holistic program. If that is 
true, the Supreme Court may be more concerned with the appear-
ance of affirmative action programs than with their actual effect. As 
long as a program appears to be more consistent with liberal concep-
tions of individual merit than with group-based conceptions of racial 
balance, the Court may be willing to uphold the program. 
IO!l Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,381-85 (2003) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
110 /d.; see also id. at 340-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
that the Michigan Law School admissions program was really designed to achieve racial bal-
ance); id. at 389 (Kennedy,]., dissenting) (explaining that "the concept of critical mass is a de-
lusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most in-
stances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas."). 
111 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72. . 
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The Court's treatment of the racial redistricting cases supports the 
theory that form can be more important than substance in the equal 
protection context. As has been noted, after invalidating a number 
of majority-minority voting districts during the 1990s on the grounds 
that they were predominantly motivated by racial considerations, the 
Court upheld what appears to be an analytically indistinguishable ma-
jority-minority district on the grounds that it was motivated primarily 
by political rather than racial considerations.112 To the extent that the 
Court was willing to relax its opposition to majority-minority voting 
districts because it came to view the policy issues that were involved as 
essentially political in nature, the Court might be willing to do the 
same thing with respect to racial balance. Because a decision by the 
political branches to pursue racial balance is also essentially political 
in nature, the Court might drop its opposition to such racial balance 
if it finds enough camouflage to permit it to do so. 
There is an interesting irony in the suggestion that racial balance 
might become constitutionally permissible if it is adequately hidden 
from view. In order to ensure that an affirmative action program is 
not viewed as a program that is facially about racial balance, the pro-
gram will have to be implemented in a way that ensures that racial 
correlations do not become too high. If a program continually ad-
mitted percentages of racial minorities that correlated with the per-
centages of racial minorities in the relevant population, the program 
would be easily recognized as a veiled racial balance program. Rather 
than use fixed racial quotas, therefore, a program will have to use 
floating quotas to ensure that the relevant minority percentages 
change periodically. 
The need for such floating quotas is ironic for two reasons. First, 
the use of a floating quota would require even more consideration of 
racial factors than a straight-forward racial balance program. The 
program administrators would not only have to ascertain the relevant 
racial percentages, as they would with a racial balance program, but 
they would then have to monitor the program's performance to make 
sure that different racial percentages were produced by the program. 
Second, such floating quotas might have to be used even under a 
nondiscriminatory program that gave no special consideration to race 
at all. In the absence of societal discrimination, one would expect a 
nondiscriminatory selection program to reflect the racial minority 
percentages that exist in the population at large. If it did not, that 
would suggest the presence of discrimination somewhere in the sys-
tem-either in the choice or the application of selection criteria. In 
a truly nondiscriminatory program, underrepresentation of racial mi-
112 See supra, text accompanying notes 27-39, 94-97 (discussing gerrymandering and voting 
district construction in the context of race). 
656 JOURNAL OF CONSTTFUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:3 
norities would be expected only if one believed that racial minorities 
were somehow inherently inferior to whites in their ability to satisfY 
neutral selection criteria. However, since a truly nondiscriminatory 
selection program would have the outward appearance of a racial bal-
ance program, the results of even a nondiscriminatory program 
would have to be adjusted to avoid the appearance of racial balance. 
Simply stating that argument suggests that there is something seri-
ously wrong with the Supreme Court's aversion to racial balance. 
Proxies and camouflage might successfully permit the political 
branches of government to realize some of the benefits of racial bal-
ance. However, they would not do much to address the more fun-
damental separation of powers problems that result from having the 
politically unaccountable Supreme Court formulate racial policy for 
the nation. In order to address that problem, more direct measures 
may be preferable. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The problem with Grutter is not simply that it holds the pursuit of 
racial balance to be unconstitutional. What is fundamentally more 
troubling is the claim that judicial review authorizes the Supreme 
Court to neutralize political solutions to the persistent problem of ra-
cial discrimination in the United States. I use the term "neutralize" 
because the Court claims to be advancing the cause of race neutrality 
when it chooses to override racial balance efforts that are adopted by 
the representative branches. But as Part II of this Article sought to 
demonstrate,m the concept of neutrality that is used by the Supreme 
Court has come to mean merely the continued sacrifice of racial mi-
nority interests in order to advance the interests of the white majority. 
Regardless of how one feels about the concept of judicial review in 
the abstract, this use of judicial review in the context of affirmative 
action seems both invidious and indefensible. The problem that 
needs to be neutralized is not the effort that the political branches 
make to promote racial balance, but rather the conception of judicial 
review that the Supreme Court invokes to override such efforts. For-
tunately, there are political strategies that the representative branches 
of government can use to resist the Court's discriminatory under-
standing of neutrality. Some strategies can be used in an effort to 
persuade the Court to reconsider its own understanding of judicial 
review. Other strategies can be used to subvert more directly the 
Court's usurpation of racial policymaking power. 
m See supra Part II (discussing ways in which the Supreme Court has, in the name of equal 
protection, systematically favored the interests of the white majority over the interests of racial 
minorities). 
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A. Persuasion 
The Supreme Court, of course, responds to politics. It was lonR 
ago observed that the Supreme Court follows the election returns, 1 
and the Court's 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore115 has often been cited as 
a recent reminder that Supreme Court political preferences can in-
fluence constitutional adjudications in dispositive ways. 116 It has even 
been suggested that the Court's somewhat surprising decision to up-
hold the affirmative action program at issue in Grutter was heavily in-
fluenced by the amicus briefs that the business community, the mili-
tary, and educational leaders filed in the case. 117 Accordingly, it 
makes sense to ask whether there are political actions that can be 
taken by the representative branches that might help "convince" the 
Court to rethink the intrusiveness with which it exercises judicial re-
view in the context of affirmative action. 
One thing that might prompt the Supreme Court to reevaluate its 
current conception of judicial review in the affirmative action context 
is vocal opposition from the political branches. Historically, several 
United States Presidents have been noteworthy for insisting that the 
political branches have as much right as the Supreme Court to inter-
pret the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson forcefully asserted that the 
doctrine of separation of powers did not authorize the Supreme 
Court to impose its understanding of the Constitution on the Presi-
dent because each branch of government had an equal right to in-
terpret the Constitution as it applied within that branch's own sphere 
of authority. 118 Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill to recharter the Bank of 
the United States with a veto message stating that he believed that the 
Bank was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's de-
114 See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901) ("[N]o matther whether th' 
constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns."). 
115 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (determining the manner in which F1orida votes should be counted in 
the 2000 presidential election). 
116 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, llO YALE 
LJ. 1407, 1407 (2001) ("It is no secret that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore has 
shaken the faith of many legal academics in the Supreme Court and in the system of judicial 
review."). 
117 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our De-
mocratic Ideals, ll7 HARv. L. REv. 113, ll7 (2003) (describing Grutterand Gratz as "the latest and 
perhaps most significant evidence that race-based affirmative action was at risk until the busi-
ness community, the military brass, and educational leaders rallied in its defense"). I view the 
decision as somewhat surprising because it is the first time that Justice O'Connor-who cast the 
decisive vote in favor of upholding the plan at issue-has ever voted to uphold a racial affirma-
tive action plan on the merits. See Grutter v. BoUinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311-44 (2003) (majority 
opinion of O'Connor,].); THE LAw OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39, at 160 n.57 (enu-
merating the affirmative action voting record of Justice O'Connor). 
118 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-20 (14th ed. 
2001) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's issuance of pardons for convictions under the Sedition 
Act of 1798 even though the courts thought the Act to be constitutional). 
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CISion in McCulloch v. Maryland119 upholding the constitutionality of 
the Bank. 120 President Franklin D. Roosevelt even drafted a speech to 
justify his decision to defy an adverse Supreme Court ruling in the 
Gold Clause Cases121 if the Court ultimately chose to invalidate the gov-
ernment's abrogation of gold clauses in federal obligations. The 
speech was never delivered, however, because the Court's ruling 
agreed with the President's reading of the Constitution. 122 All of 
these presidential arguments were rooted in the separation-of-powers-
based belief that the Court could not properly interfere with the ac-
tions of a coordinate branch of government when the coordinate 
branch was operating within a sphere of power that had been consti-
tutionally delegated to the political branch rather than to the Court. 
In that regard, those presidential assertions of autonomous constitu-
tional interpretation are directly relevant to the claim that the Su-
preme Court lacks the authority to interfere with the exercise of any 
affirmative action policymaking power that the Constitution has dele-
gated to the political branches. 
Perhaps the best known example of apparent Supreme Court def-
erence to political pressure stems from President Franklin D. Roose-
velt's Court-packing plan. Roosevelt threatened to increase the 
number of Justices on the Supreme Court in the hope that the plan 
would reduce the Supreme Court's opposition to his New Deal efforts 
to pull the nation out of the Depression. 12g By focusing the nation's 
Depression-related frustrations on the Supreme Court, Roosevelt was 
able to offer the public a cause for the nation's continued economic 
problems. 124 In addition, by characterizing his plan as a proposal for 
structural reform directed at older Justices likely to pose a threat to 
judicial efficiency, Roosevelt was able to concentrate political pres-
sure on the Justices whose attachment to older economic theories 
made them most antagonistic to his New Deal agenda. 125 The ulti-
mate success of the Court-packing plan suggests that the Supreme 
Court may respond to political pressure when the pressure is perva-
sive, intense, and threatens a prospective dilution of the Court's pres-
tige and policymaking power. Interestingly, in support of his plan, 
119 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
120 See SULLNAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 20-21 (discussing Andrew Jackson's veto mes-
sage on the bill to recharter the Bank of United States). 
121 See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (permitting the government to abrogate 
the gold clauses in federal obligations). 
122 See SULLNAN & GUI-.'THER, supra note 118, at 22 (referencing Franklin D. Roosevelt's pro-
posed gold clause speech). 
123 See id. at 135-37 (discussing Roosevelt's Court-packing plan). 
124 See id. at 136 (discussing Roosevelt's effort to blame the Supreme Court for delays in eco-
nomic recovery following the Great Depression). 
125 See id. (discussing Roosevelt's belief that the Supreme Court needed younger blood). 
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President Roosevelt employed rhetoric that emphasized the impor-
tance of preventing the Supreme Court from behaving in an uncon-
stitutional manner: 
[W]e have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take 
action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. 
We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the 
Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which will do justice under 
the Constitution-not over it. 126 
A President committed to racial equality could make a series of 
analogous political speeches that would rebuke the Supreme Court 
for impeding the nation's progress toward racial equality through the 
Court's overly intrusive judicial review of affirmative action plans.127 
These speeches could emphasize the relative institutional advantages 
that the political branches have over the Court in the formulation of 
racial policy, especially in light of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 128 but the real point of the speeches would be to send a 
political, rather than a doctrinal, message to the Court. The effec-
tiveness of these speeches could be enhanced by echoing three fea-
tures of President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. First, the Presi-
dent could blame the Supreme Court for the nation's persistent 
racial problems, emphasizing-with appropriate references to Dred 
Scott-that the political branches were trying their best to solve the 
problem of racial inequality only to have their efforts stymied by a 
Court that was pursuing an outmoded conception of equality in 
which whites always end up being more equal than racial minorities. 
Second, the President could characterize his initiative as a structural 
reform that was intended to reestablish separation-of-powers bounda-
ries by confining the Court to adjudicatory rather than policymaking 
activities. Third, the President could highlight the fact that the same 
four or five Justices voting as a conservative bloc are the ones who al-
ways vote against affirmative action and racial balance, thereby high-
lighting the political, rather than constitutional, nature of the Court's 
opposition to majoritarian remedies for racial discrimination. Even a 
conservative President with no particular commitment to racial equal-
ity should favor sending a strong political admonition to the Court, 
126 See id. (quoting President Roosevelt's March 9, 1937 radio address to the nation in which 
he called for alterations to the Court). 
127 In the past, I have criticized President Clinton for his failure to initiate political actions, 
such as those proposed here, to recapture racial policymaking power from the Supreme Court. 
See Girardeau A. Spann, Writing Off Race, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 469 (2000), available 
at http:/ /www.law.duke.edu/journals/63LCPSpann ("What President Clinton has failed to do 
is to assert the full scope of his constitutional authority to formulate race relations policy for the 
nation that elected him to be its political leader.") (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
128 See supra Part I.A (discussing the relative institutional competence of the Court and the 
political branches). 
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because conservatives typically claim that they favor judicial restraint 
and disfavor judicial policymaking under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation129-which is precisely what the Supreme Court does 
when it invalidates an affirmative action program that has been 
adopted by the political branches. 
The President and members of Congress could supplement this 
political message to the Court in a number of more concrete ways. A 
belief in deferential judicial review for benign affirmative action 
could be made a political litmus test for the appointment and confir-
mation of new federal judges, in much the same way that one's posi-
tion on abortion is often used as a litmus test for judicial appoint-
ments.130 In addition, Senators could use their filibuster power to 
help ensure that federal judges would not be appointed if they op-
posed deference to the political branches on the issue of affirmative 
. 131 
actlon. 
Pursuant to the Article III ~ower of Congress to regulate the juris-
diction of the federal courts, 2 the President and members of Con-
gress could propose legislation that would strip the Supreme Court 
and lower federal courts of their jurisdiction to review affirmative ac-
tion programs that were adopted by the representative branches of 
government. Politically motivated legislation restricting federal court 
jurisdiction has been introduced in the past with respect to a variety 
of controversial issues. 133 Although the constitutionality of such legis-
129 For example, in his 2004 State of the Union message, President George W. Bush chastised 
activist courts for reading state constitutions to require recognition of same-sex marriages, and 
raised the specter of a federal constitutional amendment to reverse those activist decisions. See 
State of Gay Unions, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at A18 (quoting Bush as saying, "Activist 
judges ... have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for the will of the 
people and their elected representatives . . . . If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon 
the people, the only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional. process.") (em-
phasis in original). Bush later went on to endorse the passage of a constitutional amendment 
prohibiting same-sex marriage. See Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Ban-
ning Gay Marriage: President Says States Could Rule on Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at 
A1 (quoting Bush as saying, "[a]fter more than two centuries of American jurisprudence, and 
millennia of human experience, a few judges and local authorities are presuming to change the 
most fundamental institution of civilization."). 
130 See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of judges?, 92 CAL. L. REv. 299, 300 (2004) 
(citing the abortion litmus test for federal judges). 
131 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardhat~ 37 J. MARsHAll L. REv. 523, 524-29 (2004) (dis-
cussing the recent filibuster use by Senate Democrats to defeat politically undesirable Republi-
can nominees to the federal judiciary, largely because of the perceived opposition of those 
nominees to civil rights). 
132 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (granting Congress the power to create inferior federal 
courts and to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respectively). 
133 See RICHARD H. FALLON,JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYsTEM 319-26 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing proposed jurisdiction-stripping legislation 
concerning controversial issues such as busing, school prayer, and abortion). 
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lation may in some circumstances be uncertain, 1 ~4 the point of intro-
ducing jurisdiction-stripping legislation in the affirmative action con-
text would be more for its political effect than to secure its actual 
adoption. 
More forcefully, the President and members of Congress could 
propose constitutional amendments that would not only permit the 
pursuit of racial balance in the context of affirmative action, but 
would also regulate or eliminate judicial review of majoritarian af-
firmative action. 1 ~5 Such an amendment would presumably eliminate 
any constitutional difficulties presented by jurisdiction-stripping legis-
lation, but again, the primary motive of introducing such proposed 
amendments would be to exert political leverage on the Court. Fi-
nally, the President and members of Congress could propose bills of 
impeachment directed at Supreme Court Justices who failed to re-
spond to more subtle political messages and continued to violate 
separation-of-powers principles by overriding majoritarian affirmative 
action programs. 1 ~6 The impeachment of President Clinton estab-
lishes that such politically motivated use of the impeachment process 
can occur even for less lofty purposes. 1 ~7 
There are a number of ways in which the political branches can 
send political messages to the Supreme Court in the hope of having 
the Court relax its intrusion into the politically accountable process 
of racial policymaking. I suspect that the Court is likely to be respon-
sive to a set of forcefully conveyed political messages, just as it appears 
to have been responsive to such messages in the context of the New 
Deal Court-packing plan. However, if the Court does not respond to 
political pressure, more subversive actions are possible. 
B. Subversion 
The Supreme Court can properly expect only the degree of defer-
ence to which it is legitimately entitled. When the Court exceeds the 
scope of its own constitutional power by usurping policymaking 
power from the representative branches, the system of checks and 
balances requires that the representative branches resist the Court's 
ultra vires actions to the extent that the Constitution gives the politi-
cal branches the power to do so. If the representative branches can-
1114 See id. (discussing the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping legislation). 
135 See U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing the process for amending the Constitution). 
1116 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Impeachment and Constitutional Structure, 
5 WIDENER L. SVMP.]. 249, 256-58 (2000) (discussing the politically motivated impeachment 
efforts directed at Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren and Supreme Court Associate Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas). 
'" See id. (discussing the politically motivated impeachment effort directed at President Bill 
Clinton). 
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not find ways to persuade the Supreme Court to adopt a more defer-
ential approach to judicial review in the context of affirmative action, 
the representative branches should find ways to subvert the Court's 
efforts to upset the constitutional balance of powers. 
The idea that subversion can be a legitimate response to an ille-
gitimate legal order is not a new one. 138 However, the idea has been 
given new vitality by Professor Paul Butler. Butler has argued, for ex-
ample, that jury nullification can constitute an appropriate response 
by racial minority jurors to the forms of racial discrimination that are 
built into the criminal justice system. 139 He has also argued that it is 
praiseworthy for judges to circumvent a law that they believe to be im-
moral. 140 Butler is careful to limit his support of subversion to ques-
tions of morality, as opposed to mere political disagreements. 141 I am 
advocating subversion by the political branches, directed at the man-
ner in which the Supreme Court has exercised judicial review under 
the Equal Protection Clause, because I believe the Supreme Court's 
actions to be unconstitutional, illegitimate, and immoral. I believe 
this because the Supreme Court's racial jurisprudence has a proven 
propensity to promote racial injustice. 142 
Political subversion of Supreme Court decisions can be effective, 
as the aftermath of the Brown decisions demonstrates. 143 The massive 
resistance that followed the Supreme Court's desegregation decision 
was successful in delaying any meaningful desegregation of southern 
schools for a decade. 144 Presumably, that is because the Court so 
"
18 The founding of the United States was premised on the belief that subversion is a legiti-
mate response to an illegitimate legal order. See JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 6 (3d ed. 2001) (citing THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), declaring that "whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute 
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such 
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."). 
189 Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal justice System, 105 
YALE LJ. 677, 678 (1995). 
140 See Paul Butler, Subversive judges (Oct. 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript delivered at 
Georgetown-Sloan Interdisciplinary Workshop, on file with author). 
141 See, e.g., id. at 13 n.36 (stating that "disagreement with the law on public policy grounds-
as opposed to moral grounds-does not justify subversion"). 
14 See generally RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7, at 85-169 (discussing the ways in 
which the Supreme Court has historically sacrificed racial minority interests to advance the in-
terests of the white majority). 
143 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating the separate-but-equal doctrine in pub-
lic schools); see also Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) requiring desegregation of public schools 
"with all deliberate speed."). 
144 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 456-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's response to 
massive southern resistance following the Brown decisions). Although I have suggested that the 
Supreme Court responds to political pressure, both Brawn I and II and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1, 18-21 (1958) (insisting on desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas 
despite massive resistance), are often cited to illustrate the Supreme Court's capacity for judicial 
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feared the political backlash that followed the issuance of Brown I, 145 
that it felt compelled to retreat to the "all deliberate speed" formula 
of Brown Il. 146 This was a means of delaying implementation of the 
Court's desegregation requirement. 147 Moreover, the year after Brown 
I was decided, the post-Brown threat of massive southern resistance 
caused the United States Supreme Court to back down from a politi-
cal confrontation with the Virginia Supreme Court over the issue of 
miscegenation. In its infamous Naim v. Naim148 decisions, the Court 
refused to invalidate a Virginia miscegenation statute that had been 
defiantly upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court, even though Brown I 
seemed to have made miscegenation laws clearly unconstitutional. 149 
Perhaps similar massive resistance to the Supreme Court's intrusive 
judicial review of affirmative action would be similarly successful in 
marginalizing Supreme Court efforts to override the affirmative ac-
tion policies adopted by the representative branches. And, of course, 
there is something appealingly symmetrical about using the a tech-
nique to promote racial equality that is the same as the technique 
independence. However, that characterization is inaccurate. Cooper constituted the only effort 
by the Supreme Court to enforce the desegregation mandate of the Brown decisions prior to 
1963. Moreover, the bulk of southem school desegregation that followed resulted not from 
Supreme Court decisions, but from the political actions of Congress in passing the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and the political actions of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 
enforcing that Act. STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 457-58. 
145 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
146 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (requiring the district courts to take actions towards desegre-
gation "with all deliberate speed."). 
147 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 455-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's delay in imple-
menting its Brown desegregation requirement). 
148 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam); 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam). 
149 In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam), and 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per cu-
riam), the United States Supreme Court was asked to hold unconstitutional a Virginia miscege-
nation statute that had been upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The United 
States Supreme Court vacated the Virginia decision and remanded for clarification of the re-
cord. 350 U.S. at 891. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, merely reaffirmed its 
earlier decision and refused to clarify the record. Nairn v. Nairn, 90 S.E.2d 849,850 (1956) (per 
curiam). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to recall or amend the man-
date, finding that the constitutional question had not been "properly presented." This allowed 
the Virginia court's decision to remain in effect. 350 U.S. at 985. Because the neutrality prin-
ciple that had been announced in Brown I seemed to make the Virginia miscegenation statute 
unconstitutional, and because the Supreme Court's failure to resolve Naim on the merits also 
seemed to violate a federal statute giving the Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction over the 
case, the Supreme Court's actions in Naim v. Naim have been vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Ge-
rald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Vinues "-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in ju-
dicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (noting that "there are very few dismissals similarly 
indefensible in law."); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REv. 1, 34 (1959) (noting that dismissal of the miscegenation case was "wholly without basis 
in the law."). The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute 
eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967), when only 16 states still had 
miscegenation statutes on the books. !d. at 6. 
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previously used by southern segregationists to promote racial dis-
crimination. 
The political branches can subvert the Supreme Court's illegiti-
mate exercise of judicial review in the context of affirmative action by 
aggressively utilizing the full scope of the power that the Constitution 
grants to the political branches. I have suggested that the political 
branches could introduce jurisdiction-stripping legislation, constitu-
tional amendments, and bills of impeachment in an effort to pressure 
the Supreme Court into changing its conception of appropriate judi-
cial review. But the political branches need not stop at the mere in-
troduction of such measures. If the Supreme Court does not respond 
to political pressure, the political branches also have the constitu-
tional authority to implement those remedies. Congress could actu-
ally pass jurisdiction-stripping legislation that insulated affirmative ac-
tion from judicial review. The states could actually amend the 
Constitution in a way that made affirmative action unambiguously 
constitutional. And recalcitrantJustices could actually be removed from 
office by impeachment. 
There is little doubt that the political branches have the explicit 
authority to take such actions. However, it is equally clear that the 
use of such extreme measures as an antidote to Supreme Court ap-
propriations of legislative or executive policymaking power seems in-
consistent with existing conventions about the proper use of those 
constitutional powers. But existing constitutional conventions can be 
changed. 
Professor Mark Tushnet describes a political phenomenon that he 
calls constitutional hardball, in which political players seek to combine 
rhetoric and action in wars that alter pre-existing understandings of 
the constitutional order. 15 Tushnet offers three examples. The first 
is the aggressive use of the filibuster by Senate Democrats to block 
the confirmation of George W. Bush's more conservative judicial 
nominees, and the Republican rejoinder that such use of the fili-
buster has interfered with the President's constitutional power to 
make judicial appointments. The second example is the effort by Re-
publican majorities in Colorado and Texas to redraw voting district 
lines in ways that would perpetuate Republican control of the legis-
lature, and the ensuing decision of Texas Democrats to resist that ef-
fort by absenting themselves from both the legislature, and the State of 
Texas, in order to ensure the absence of a legislative quorum. The 
third example is the Republican impeachment of President Clinton 
in the House of Representatives despite the absence of a reasonable 
likelihood that a Senate conviction would follow. All of these actions 
150 Tushnet, supra note 131. See generaUy MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
1-8 (2003) (describing Tushnet's concept of a new constitutional order). 
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were authorized by the letter of the Constitution, but all seemed to 
violate pre-existing conventions about what sorts of actions were con-
stitutionally appropriate under what circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the political players in each instance were willing to 
risk violating existing constitutional norms because they believed the 
stakes of the underlying political debate to be very high, and because 
they wished to establish a new constitutional order. 151 In the context 
of affirmative action, the political branches could-with great cere-
mony-use the jurisdiction-stripping power, the amendment power, 
and the impeachment power in an unconventional manner precisely 
to establish a new constitutional understanding about the proper al-
location of racial policymaking power between the political branches 
and the Supreme Court. 
There is another way to play constitutional hardball in the context of 
affirmative action. The representative branches could adopt an ag-
gressive interpretation of the Article III restrictions on the scope of 
federal judicial power that were created by the Supreme Court itself. 
Article III limits the judicial power to "[c]ases" and 
"[c]ontroversies."152 Under the prevailing model of federal adjudica-
tion that emanates from john Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madi-
son, 
153 that restriction has come to mean that the federal courts-
including the Supreme Court-are limited to retrospectively resolv-
ing concrete disputes between adversary parties, and are not institu-
tionally competent to render advisory opinions that are prospective 
or legislative in nature. 154 In reality, it has always been so common for 
the Supreme Court to issue opinions designed to have a prospective 
effect on the resolution of controversial policy issues that its resolu-
tion of the dispute between the particular parties is typically viewed as 
incidental at best.155 
However, the political branches have the power to create a new 
constitutional order in which the Marbury-based separation-of-powers 
limitation on federal court jurisdiction is actually taken seriously. 
The political branches could treat Supreme Court adjudications as 
binding on the parties before the Court, but not as creating prospec-
151 See id. at 8-13 (outlining the challenges that politicians must overcome to establish a new 
constitutional regime). 
152 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
153 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-80 (1803) (setting the foundation for judicial review). 
154 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 133, at 67-90 (discussing how the case or controversy re-
quirement is traceable to the model of adjudication advanced by Chief justice Marshall in Mar-
bury). 
155 For example, it is difficult to imagine that Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was really about 
whether Linda Brown could attend an integrated school. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that 
Marbury itself was really about whether William Marbury could get an official piece of paper 
naming him a justice of the peace. Both cases were obviously intended to establish broad, pro-
spective principles oflaw relating to racial segregation and judicial review, respectively. 
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tive legislative-type rules of constitutional law. In the new constitu-
tional order, Supreme Court precedents would be narrowly con-
strued so that they did not control future cases involving different 
parties and different fact situations. 
Ironically, this approach would have the effect of making Su-
preme Court opinions advisory to the political bodies. Supreme 
Court opinions would resolve the particular disputes that were before 
the Court, but they would have a prospective effect on legislative and 
executive policymakers only to the extent that those policymakers 
found the Supreme Court opinions ~ersuasive enough to incorporate 
into their own policymaking actions. 56 
The new understanding of judicial review that I am advocating is 
not unprecedented. I think it is what Thomas Jefferson and Andrew 
Jackson had in mind when they argued that Supreme Court adjudica-
tions were not binding on the political branches of government when 
the political branches were acting within their own spheres of consti-
tutional authority.157 Moreover, my view is simply an extension of the 
view expressed by Abraham Lincoln in the aftermath of Dred Scott. 
Lincoln insisted that Supreme Court precedents should be read as 
binding in the cases from which they emanated, but should not be 
viewed as establishing political rules to govern the coordinate 
branches or the voters. For Lincoln, political resistance to a Supreme 
Court rule that the voters or the political branches viewed as errone-
ous was important as a means for the getting the Supreme Court to 
reverse its disfavored rule. 158 
And, of course, there is always the option of outright defiance. In 
response to a Supreme Court decision concerning Indian sovereignty 
with which President Andrew Jackson strongly disagreed, Jackson is 
reputed to have said: 'john Marshall has made his decision. Now let 
him enforce it."159 As has been noted, President Franklin D. Roose-
velt was also prepared to defy an adverse Supreme Court decision in 
156 This is ironic because the gist of the Marbury model of adjudication is that Article III 
courts do not have the authority to issue advisory opinions. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 133, at 
78-85 (discussing advisory opinions). 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 118-20 (describing the views of Thomas Jefferson and 
Andrew Jackson on the deference owed to Supreme Court adjudications). 
158 See SULLNAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 21 (discussing the views of Abraham Lincoln 
on the deference owed to Supreme Court a<ljudications). 
159 See id. at 23 (discussing Andrew Jackson's reaction to the Supreme Court decision in 
Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). In fact, the pertinent litigation was abandoned 
before a confrontation between Jackson and the Court came to a head. See SULLNAN & 
GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 23 ("[T]he litigation was abandoned before any call for presiden-
tial assistance arose."); see aLso Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and 
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969) (discussing Indian cases that created tension between 
Jackson and the Supreme Court); RICHARD H. CHUSED, CAsES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN 
PROPERlY 20-35 (1999) (describing the Indian cases and Jackson's response). 
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the Gold Clause Cases if the need to do so had arisen. 160 And the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court did successfully defy the United States Supreme 
Court in the Naim v. Naim litigation, when the United States Supreme 
Court chose to back down rather than confront the Virginia Supreme 
Court over the issue of miscegenation. 161 If all else fails, simple defi-
ance might be the most appropriate response to continued Supreme 
Court efforts to override racial policy determinations made by the 
representative branches. Mter all, we did fight a Civil War in re-
sponse to Dred Scott. 162 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the Supreme Court lacks the relative institu-
tional competence under our constitutional system of separated gov-
ernmental powers to substitute its policy preferences for the policy 
determinations made by the politically accountable branches of gov-
ernment concerning how best to implement the equal protection 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. I have also argued that 
the Supreme Court's long history of sacrificing racial minority inter-
ests for the benefit of the white majority disqualifies the Court both 
from exercising intrusive judicial review over majoritarian affirmative 
action programs adopted to benefit racial minorities, and from read-
ing the Constitution to preclude the representative branches from 
pursuing racial balance remedies for the persistent problem of racial 
discrimination. I have, therefore, urged the political branches to 
sidestep the Supreme Court's troublesome affirmative action deci-
sions to the extent that they are able to do so through the use of 
proxies and camouflage techniques. If such creative compliance ef-
forts prove unsuccessful, I have encouraged the political branches to 
utilize the full scope of their constitutional powers to persuade the 
Supreme Court to reconsider its present conception of judicial review 
in the affirmative action context. If persuasion fails, I have argued 
that the political branches have a constitutional obligation to exercise 
their constitutional powers in ways that will subvert the Court's usur-
pation of racial policymaking power, even if such subversion ulti-
mately comes to encompass outright defiance of Supreme Court de-
cisions. To the extent that my position strikes you as extreme, please 
consider that to be a measure of how strongly I feel about an issue 
that I consider to be more moral than doctrinal. 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22 (discussing speech prepared by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to defY the Supreme Court ruling in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), if an 
adverse decision had been handed down). 
161 See supra note 149 (describing the Naim v. Naim litigation). 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (discussing Dred Scott and the Civil War). 
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I antiCipate that my subversive advocacy will be met with the 
charge that I am essentially promoting lawlessness. I suspect that I 
will be accused of impatiently placing my parochial short-term inter-
est in racial equality ahead of the nation's more important long-term 
goal of maintaining a stable form of government in which the Su-
preme Court retains the legitimacy needed to operate as the primary 
guardian of our individual rights. And I imagine that I will ultimately 
be charged with naivete for my belief that the majoritarian political 
process could ultimately end up being more protective of racial mi-
nority rights than the Supreme Court is likely to be. 
My response to the charge of lawlessness is that I am trying to 
remedy what I perceive to be the lawlessness of the present regime, in 
which the Supreme Court has been permitted to exceed the scope of 
its constitutional authority in ways that repeatedly harm the interests 
of racial minorities. My response to the charge of impatient parochi-
alism is that I can conceive of few principles as universal as the equal-
ity principle that prohibits invidious discrimination, and that racial 
minorities have waited long enough for that principle to be honored 
in the United States. My response to the charge of naivete is that I 
am not so much naive as hopeful. My hope is that the majoritarian 
political branches, supported by the majoritarian electorate, will do 
more to promote the cause of racial equality if they are no longer 
constrained by the discriminatory proclivities that have been exhib-
ited by the Supreme Court throughout its history. How far the cul-
ture will go is likely be a direct function of how much the culture ca-
res about racial justice. I may ultimately turn out to be wrong in 
placing my hope in the process of representative democracy. But, for 
the moment at least, it seems better than the alternative. 
